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1. INTRODUCTION 
A significant amount of discussion has surrounded the question as to whether the 
market transfer effect in the Hawaii longline swordfish fishery occurred during the 
US swordfish closure of 2001-2004, primarily due to the potential impact on sea 
turtle mortality. The market transfer hypothesis posits that any reduction in the US 
swordfish catch due to increased US regulation will result in increased catch by 
foreign fleets (Squires, 2013 and Pacific Fishery Management Council, 2013). If 
the market transfer hypothesis is correct—and if the foreign catch would not have 
otherwise increased—then the total number of sea turtle interactions by fishing 
fleets during this period may have increased, since foreign swordfish fleets 
typically have higher turtle bycatch rates than the Hawaii fleet (Bartram, Kaneko, 
and Kucey-Nakamura, 2010). 
The starting point for the academic work in support of the market transfer effect 
during the Hawaii longline closure of 2001-2004 is a paper by Rausser et al. (2009): 
“Unintended Consequences: The Spillover Effects of Common Property 
Regulations.” In this paper, the authors claim to uncover evidence in support of the 
market transfer effect. They base their case on two main points: 1) while US fresh 
swordfish catch decreased due to the 2001-2004 closure, there was also an increase 
in fresh US swordfish imports (caught by foreign fleets) during this same period, 
and 2) the overall swordfish catch within the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO), where 
they believe the market transfer effect occurred, increased after the closure. The 
authors conclude that 2,882 additional turtles were killed worldwide because of the 
Hawaii longline swordfish fishery closure. More recent work by Chan and Pan 
(2016) reaches similar conclusions. 
To our knowledge, no one has assessed the underlying assumptions that Rausser 
et al. and Chan and Pan rely on to reach their conclusions. Other studies have 
examined the market transfer effect in the Hawaii swordfish fishery (see Sarmiento, 
2006, Bartram et al., 2010, Mukherjee, 2015, Squires et al., 2016), but all of them 
essentially accept the results from Rausser et al. and Chan and Pan. 
Our analysis indicates that Rausser et al.’s and Chan and Pan’s conclusions 
about increased global turtle mortality are not robust, because while they provide 
evidence that demonstrates a correlation between the US closure and a market 
transfer effect, this correlation can be explained by other factors. They do not 
provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Hawaii closure is the primary 
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factor that led foreign fleets to increase their swordfish catch. For the market 
transfer hypothesis to be robust, one must demonstrate that foreign fleets in the 
EPO increased their catch in response to the closure. This paper shows that there 
are other explanations for the increased swordfish catch not accounted for in these 
previous papers, in particular: 
1. Spain significantly increased its catch during the 2001-2004 
closure period and this increase likely accounted for the 
subsequently higher US swordfish imports.1 However, as our paper 
indicates, the Spanish fleet expanded significantly during this period 
due to increased subsidies from the Spanish government and the 
European Union. This increased Spanish fishing capacity was 
completely independent of US regulations (and began before 2001), 
but its effects coincidentally overlap with the 2001-2004 closure. 
2. While Spain’s catch dipped after the closure ended, it quickly 
increased again, far surpassing the average during the 2001-2004 
closure, indicating sufficient demand for Spanish catch independent 
of the US market. Furthermore, as discussed below, the demand for 
swordfish from countries besides the US is more than adequate to 
sustain the Spanish fleet. Put another way, because of the closure, 
the US happened to provide a convenient and temporary market 
opportunity for the Spanish fleet, but they subsequently found many 
more willing buyers. 
3. In the case of swordfish, most proponents of the market transfer 
effect assume (explicitly or implicitly) that swordfish not caught by 
the US fleet in Hawaii will migrate to other fishing grounds, where 
                                                          
1 As Rausser et al. (2009) correctly point out, because fishing fleets often sell fish through 
foreign ports, it is very hard to determine exactly which swordfish from which fleets ended 
up as new US imports. Consequently, they only analyze changes at the regional level. The 
only country that fishes swordfish in the EPO region which significantly increased fresh 
swordfish exports to the US during 2001-2004 was Panama; however, Panamanian 
swordfish catch in the EPO from 2001-2004 averaged only 225 tons, while in 2003 and 
2004 they exported over 1000 tons to the US (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Information 
and Statistics, 1998-2016 and NOAA, 2000-2004), indicating that much of this fish had to 
have come from another fleet. The most likely fleet that accounted for these increased 
swordfish exports to the US was Spain, which sold them through Panama.  
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they will then be caught by foreign fleets. A growing body of 
evidence suggests, however, that swordfish tend to remain within 
the sub-regions of the EPO and are not as migratory as once thought. 
Therefore, the additional swordfish caught by the Spanish fleet are 
not the same swordfish that compete with the US fleets. 
4. The likelihood that the market transfer effect occurred in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), as suggested by Chan 
and Pan (2016), is low. Countries that fish in this region include 
Australia, China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, and the US. Chinese Taipei and the 
Philippines are the only countries that increased their swordfish 
landings during the 2001-2004 closure period. Chinese Taipei did 
not directly increase swordfish effort; they continued a seasonal 
coastal harpoon fishery between 2001 and 2004, and the bulk of 
their increase in swordfish landings can be attributed to the 
development of their tuna fisheries and a subsequent increase in 
swordfish bycatch. The Philippines only fish for swordfish using 
municipal vessels and primarily use single hook hand lines, which 
would not overlap with the part of the WCPO used by the Hawaii 
longline fishery nor very likely result in a large increase in turtle 
mortality.  
Based on these findings, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that the market transfer effect occurred in the Hawaii swordfish fishery 
during the closure of 2001-2004, and therefore insufficient evidence to suggest 
more turtles were killed. Furthermore, given that pelagic fish are a high value global 
commodity sought by many nations, the incentive to increase production by any 
one country or fleet is likely largely independent of the regulations of any other 
single country. There are many factors that influence catch which need to be 
examined, which is especially true for swordfish. 
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2. WHY THE SPANISH CATCH DRAMATICALLY INCREASED 
POST-2001 
EU domestic consumption of swordfish increased significantly post-2001 largely 
due to an outbreak of mad cow disease, as well as a large increase in subsidies to 
Spanish fishing fleets. Franz Fischler, the agricultural minister of the European 
Union, stated at a news conference in 2000, “Mad cow disease knows no borders 
but is moving from one member state to another” (Daley, 2000).  In Spain, “the 
meat industry was severely affected, with slaughterhouses and meatpackers 
reporting a fall of 70 percent in animals produced for consumption” (Daley, 2000). 
The large drop in demand for beef after the outbreak created a search for alternative 
animal-based proteins to replace bovine sources. Following the announcements 
linking mad cow disease to degenerative brain disease, European consumers 
significantly reduced their consumption of beef. Consequently, beef producers 
reduced their herds, thereby removing cattle from the food chain (Perloff, 2014).  
Furthermore, in 2003 Jackie Hruby, US Meat Export Federation director for 
Europe, Russia, and the Middle East said: “The EU has a large and growing beef 
deficit expected to reach 450,000 metric tons in the next two years. This deficit 
comes from a decline in beef production and a recovery from beef consumption 
following the [mad cow disease] crisis in Europe a few years ago” (Kamenski, 
2005).  
This reduction in beef consumption throughout Europe produced a 
corresponding increase in demand for fish protein within the EU. During this same 
time, the European Union significantly increased subsidies to Spanish fishing 
fleets. All of this was completely independent of US policy in the Hawaii longline 
swordfish fishery. 
The EU’s head of fisheries Valérie Lainé stated, “Politically [the fishing 
industry] is more important than any other industry” (Wilson, Cabra, and García, 
2014). Starting in 2000 (the year preceding the Hawaii longline closure) and 
continuing through 2006, the EU gave Spain nearly half (46%) of its entire fishery 
subsidies (approximately $1.7 billion) to maintain and increase their fleets. The 
Spanish government increased this subsidy by an additional $675 million, bringing 
the total subsidies between 2000 and 2006 to $2.39 billion (Greenpeace España, 
2010). These subsidies were used for a large construction and modernization effort 
within the Spanish fleet. During this time, 50 new Spanish vessels were constructed, 
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all of them larger than 30 meters, whereas most vessels prior to this were less than 
25 meters in length. These new, large-scale vessels were thus able to hold more fish 
and stay out at sea longer. 
Spanish culture is rooted in fishing, and Spain continues to be the primary 
source for swordfish within the EU (Spanish Ministry for Agriculture, Food, and 
the Environment, 2013). Spain is the EU’s largest fishing nation in terms of catch, 
tonnage, and global coverage, and contributed an average of 67% of total EU 
swordfish catch from 2000-2013 (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Information and 
Statistics, 1998-2016). Throughout the mad cow scare (and beyond), Spain played 
a key role in providing swordfish and other fish protein to the EU. The situation is 
summed up by University of Miami marine science adjunct professor and record-
setting fisherman, Stephen Sloan, who in his book Ocean Bankruptcy: World 
Fisheries on the Brink of Disaster stated: 
In the year 2001, with its mad-cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, 
and anthrax scare in Europe, there was a greater demand for protein 
to replace all the cattle that were destroyed. The one great source 
left was the oceans, already under severe pressure in so-called 
normal times. 
Sloan describes how under a 1999 agreement, the European Commission (EC) 
was set to deduct approximately 4,000 metric tons from the 1999 swordfish quota, 
reducing it from 14,000 to approximately 10,000 metric tons. Since swordfish bring 
about $3.00 - $4.00 per pound at the dock, this equated to an approximate $30 
million reduction in revenue. However, the EC ultimately ignored this 
recommendation and allowed swordfish to be exploited at the higher rates. 
To summarize, two factors contributed to the increase in demand for swordfish 
in the EU after 2000: the shift to fish instead of livestock protein due to an outbreak 
of mad cow disease, and the corresponding increase in the fishing capacity of the 
Spanish fleet, driven by a large increase in subsidies. Neither of these factors had 
anything to do with the closure of the Hawaii longline swordfish fishery. 
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3. EPO CATCH BY COUNTRY FROM 2000-2013 
Of the 14 countries that fish for swordfish in the EPO, only four increased their 
catch by a significant amount (i.e., more than 500 tons) from 2001-2004 (compared 
to their 2000 levels): Chinese Taipei, Spain, Chile, and China. Figure 1 below 
shows the annual swordfish catch for these 4 countries from 2000-2013. The first 
thing to notice is the incredible volatility in swordfish catch from year to year, with 
individual fleet catches often changing by thousands of tons in either direction from 
any given year to the next. More importantly, if the market transfer effect 
hypothesis is valid, after 2004 the countries that had dramatically increased their 
catch during the closure would have experienced significant long-term reductions, 
given the increased US catch and the loss of US export markets. This is not what 
occurred. 
While Spanish catch declined in 2005, it quickly rebounded during 2006-2008, 
before increasing significantly in 2009, falling in 2010, and once again 
skyrocketing in 2011 and 2013. The average Spanish swordfish catch from 2005-
2013 was almost double the catch during 2001-2004 (8204 tons compared to 4802). 
In fact, none of the countries that experienced significant swordfish catch increases 
during the 2001-2004 closure period saw reduced average catch once the Hawaii 
fishery reopened in 2005; Chinese Taipei, China, and Chile all experienced 
significant average increases in swordfish catch in the EPO post-2004. 
What the data clearly show is that the trend for swordfish catch in the EPO 
increased steadily from 2000-2013. Consequently, attributing any increased catch 
by non-Hawaii fleets during 2001-2004 to the Hawaii closure is inconsistent with 
the totality of the available data. Total swordfish catch from all 14 EPO countries, 
despite the yearly volatility, has steadily increased from 27,252 tons in 2000 to 
44,977 in 2013, indicating that there is more than enough global demand and more 
than enough markets in which to sell swordfish, regardless of the regulations of any 
single country (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Information and Statistics, 1998-
2016). 
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 Figure 1. Swordfish catch in the EPO 1993-2013 (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Information and Statistics, 1998-2016). 
4. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE: PACIFIC SWORDFISH STOCK 
DIFFERENTIATION 
On page 27, Rausser et al. (2009) state: 
Swordfish is a highly migratory species, and there are a small 
number of stocks in the Pacific. This would mean that the reduction 
of catch by Hawaiian fisheries would cause an increase in fish 
available to other fisheries, which would increase their catch per unit 
effort, and attract more fishers to the market. Third, the fishing 
grounds frequented by Hawaiian longliners are largely international 
waters, and longliners often travel thousands of miles in fishing 
expeditions. Therefore, any decrease in effort by Hawaiian fishers 
might be compensated by foreign fishers working the same fishing 
grounds. 
As it turns out, however, swordfish in the Pacific Ocean very likely do not 
migrate (or migrate infrequently) across different fishery sub-regions. The Hawaii 
fleet operates solely in the Northern Pacific Ocean and Spanish fleets operate solely 
in the Southern EPO, so any fish that were not caught by Hawaii-based longline 
fishermen due to the closure would have to migrate into the waters frequented by 
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the Spanish fleets for the market transfer effect to have taken place (55428-00 
STATE (INR/GGI); García-Cortés and Mejuto, 2005; Hinton and Maunder, 2011). 
Although the southeastern and central north Pacific (Hawaii region) are very 
similar, they are not the same fishing grounds and do not hold the same stock 
populations. Alvarado Bremer et al. (2006) have studied swordfish migratory 
patterns extensively and conclude that that there are four distinct swordfish stocks: 
The Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, and Southeast. Figure 2 below shows several 
swordfish migration patterns tracked using telemetry tagging techniques in the 
Southeast region, none of which migrated out of the region over the course of the 
study (Abascal et al., 2010). This suggests that swordfish not caught by Hawaii 
longline fishermen do not migrate to other regional fisheries, such as those 
frequented by Spanish fleets. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Southeast Pacific swordfish (off the coast of Chile) migrations, by 
month, showing the swordfish moving northwest for autumn and then returning south for 
early spring, but remaining within the Southeast Pacific region (F.J. Abascal et al., 2009). 
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5. THE CHAN AND PAN STUDY 
In 2012, NOAA issued Technical Memorandum NMFS-PIFSC-30 entitled, 
“Spillover Effects of Environmental Regulation for Sea Turtle Protection: The Case 
of the Hawaii Shallow-set Longline Fishery.” In this memorandum, Chan and Pan 
build upon the work of Rausser et al. to arrive at similar conclusions: that the 2001-
2004 closure led to increased global turtle mortality. However, they arrive at this 
conclusion by contradicting one of Rausser et al.’s (2009) key claims: that the 
market transfer effect was likely isolated to the EPO. Instead, Chan and Pan claim 
that the market transfer effect also likely occurred in the WCPO, the predominant 
fishing grounds of the Hawaii longline fleet. 
But just as Rausser et al. do not examine the many factors that contribute to 
swordfish effort by non-US fleets, and simply assume that any increase in swordfish 
catch is attributable to the closure alone, Chan and Pan also claim correlation is 
causation. 
Their 2012 work was published in 2016 in Marine Resource Economics under 
a slightly different title, “Spillover Effects of Environmental Regulation for Sea 
Turtle Protection in the Hawaii Longline Swordfish Fishery.” The authors claim to 
find evidence of “production displacement”—lower US Pacific swordfish catch 
leading to higher non-US Pacific swordfish catch—because they find an inverse 
correlation between US Pacific swordfish catch and non-US Pacific swordfish 
catch after 2001. They then follow similar logic as Rausser et al. to conclude that 
this market transfer effect led to increased turtle mortality. 
In essence, Chan and Pan simply show that US and non-US swordfish catch 
was uncorrelated between 1991-2000 (largely due to the high volatility of both US 
and non-US catch during this period—see Figure 3 below) and then correlated from 
2001-2012, when US catch steadily declined and non-US catch continued its 
increase (which began in 1991). They attribute the post-2000 correlation to the 
change in US policy (the Hawaii closure), without a rigorous attempt to analyze the 
many other factors that could have also led to this change, most of which are 
completely independent of US regulation. 
There are only two fisheries that increased their swordfish catch in the WCPO 
during the closure: Chinese Taipei and the Philippines. Neither is likely to have 
been impacted by the Hawaii closure. In the WCPO, Chinese Taipei primarily 
caught swordfish as bycatch from their tuna fisheries, which experienced a 
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significant increase in vessels after 1996, apart from a small-scale seasonal coastal 
harpoon fishery (Fisheries Agency Council of Agriculture, 2007). In the case of the 
Philippines, swordfish landings occurred in the municipal rather than commercial 
fishery, primarily using hand lines; these small fishing vessels operated entirely in 
the inshore area and did not overlap with the commercial region of the WCPO 
frequented by the Hawaii longline swordfish fishery (Lewis, 2005). In addition, the 
single hook hand lines are considered ecosystem-friendly and have very low 
incidence of turtle mortality, unlike the non-discriminatory longlines used by 
Hawaiian vessels (Cochrane and García, 2009). If there were an incidental increase 
in swordfish landings in this fishery due to the 2001-2004 closure, it would not have 
resulted in increased turtle mortality. 
 
Figure 3. Total Pacific Ocean swordfish catch by country (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Information and Statistics, 2017). 
To summarize, Chan and Pan expand Rausser et al.’s analysis to include the 
WCPO, and they find a correlation between US and non-US swordfish catch in the 
WCPO in the post-2000 time period (see Figure 4 below), but this does not signify 
a causal link. Just as in the case of the Spanish fleets, many other factors could have 
contributed to increases in non-US catch in the WCPO besides the closure, 
including increased subsidies in the fisheries or the construction of a larger fleet 
that was built in the lead up to 2001. In addition, if foreign fleets increased their 
catch in response to the closure from 2001-2004, we would expect to witness a 
decrease in catch after 2004 when the Hawaii fishery reopened, but the opposite 
occurred; non-US catch continued to increase in the WCPO through 2007. 
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 Figure 4. US and non-US Swordfish Production in the North and Central Pacific Ocean, 
1991–2012 (FAO, 1998-2016). 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
For the market transfer hypothesis to be robust in the case of the Hawaii longline 
swordfish closure of 2001-2004, one must demonstrate that foreign fleets in the 
EPO and WCPO increased their catch in response to the closure. This paper 
demonstrates that there is insufficient evidence to support such a claim. While there 
is a negative correlation between non-US swordfish catch and US catch after 2000, 
there are several other reasonable explanations for this correlation. In particular, the 
significant increase in the Spanish fleet’s swordfish catch was directly related to 
increases in EU and Spanish fleet subsidies independent of the Hawaii closure. In 
addition, the increase in EU demand for swordfish occurred at a time when 
European consumers significantly decreased their beef demand due to concerns 
about mad cow disease. 
Even if Spain temporarily increased its swordfish exports to the US from 2001-
2004, these fish would most likely have been sold elsewhere had the Hawaii 
swordfish fishery not been closed. Since the Hawaii swordfish fishery reopened in 
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2005, Spain’s swordfish catch has continued to increase, far surpassing its 2001-
2004 average. Other countries that have increased their catch significantly during 
the closure include Chinese Taipei, China, and Chile, which all fish in either the 
EPO, WCPO, or both. Similar to Spain, none of these countries decreased their 
catch after the reopening of Hawaii’s fishery in 2004, as predicted by the market 
transfer effect. Additionally, in the WCPO, the only two countries to increase their 
swordfish catch in the region between 2001-2004—Chinese Taipei and the 
Philippines—either did not specifically increase swordfish effort (Chinese Taipei), 
or only continued to fish for swordfish using municipal vessels and hand lines 
within their own Exclusive Economic Zone (Philippines). 
Finally, recent scientific studies of swordfish migration patterns suggest that 
these fish do not migrate freely within the EPO region, as previously thought, but 
instead tend to stay within the sub-regions that are frequented by different fleets 
that do not necessarily compete for the same fish. 
In conclusion, a more thorough evaluation of the available data indicates that 
there are many plausible explanations for the increase in non-US swordfish catch 
during the 2001-2004 Hawaiian closure, and therefore, there is insufficient 
evidence to claim that the closure is the underlying driver. Consequently, there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that the market transfer effect occurred. We find 
no robust evidence to suggest that future restrictions or expansions of the Hawaii 
fishery will cause a corresponding net change in turtle bycatch by foreign vessels. 
In our judgment, US policymakers should base domestic fisheries regulations 
on the impacts to US fisheries and the resources contained within them, not on 
hypothesized impacts on foreign fishing fleets. Furthermore, long-term efforts to 
reduce sea turtle bycatch must involve strengthening regulations in countries that 
have much weaker standards than the US. The potential for strong global turtle 
bycatch standards is bolstered by the results of NOAA Fisheries’ Northeast Distant 
Fishery Experiment’s efforts to reduce turtle bycatch rates in the Hawaii swordfish 
fishery, which ultimately led to its reopening in 2005 (Watson, Foster, Epperly, and 
Shah, 2004). NOAA tested various hooks and bait types, and demonstrated that 
reducing turtle bycatch in the swordfish fishery is both technically and 
economically feasible. With assistance from the US, these practices could be 
adopted by foreign fleets, leading to truly sustainable global bycatch standards.  
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